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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-ENFORCEMENT OF NLRB ORDERS-POWER 
OF CouRT OF APPEALS To MoDIFY SCOPE OF CONSENT ORDER-A complaint 
issued by the National Labor Relations Board charged respondents, an 
employer and two labor unions, with illegally maintaining a closed or 
preferential shop.1 Following the issuance of the complaint, a settlement 
agreement was reached in which respondents stipulated to waive a hearing 
and all other proceedings to which they might be entitled under the 
National Labor Relations Act or under rules and regulations of the Board.2 
Respondents also consented to the entry of a broad cease-and-desist order 
and a subsequent decree in which they were ordered to refrain from un-
lawful preferential hiring arrangements with each other, or with any other 
employer or labor organization. When the NLRB petitioned for enforce-
ment of the consent order, the First Circuit, on its own motion, excised the 
references to any other employer or labor organization.3 On certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, one Justice dissenting. 
Section IO(e) of the National Labor Relations Act4 deprives courts of ap-
peals of power to modify, sua sponte, NLRB consent orders not contested 
before the Board even though the Board's record contains no findings sup-
porting such order. NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318 (1961). 
Although the National Labor Relations Act gives the Board exclusive 
initial authority to prevent unfair labor practices, its orders are not self-
enforcing. In order to obtain judicial enforcement the Board must first 
petition a court of appeals for a decree,11 which can then serve as the basis 
for contempt proceedings in the event of non-compliance.6 The courts of 
appeals have the power to modify Board orders when the Board petitions 
for enforcement, such power being derived from the provision of section 
IO(e) which authorizes the court "to make and enter a decree enforcing, 
modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in 
part the order of the Board."7 This broad authorization is immediately 
followed, however, by a clause providing that no objection that has not 
been raised before the Board shall be considered by a reviewing court, 
1 The complaint alleged violations of §§ 8(a)(l)-(3), 8(b)(l)(A), (2) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452-453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(l)-(3), 
(b)(l)(A), (2) (1958). 
2 See 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), (c) (1958); 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.9, 
102.46 (Supp. 1961). 
3 283 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1960). 
4 § IO(e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § I60(e) (1958). 
Ii NLRA, § IO(e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). See H.R. 
REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3·6 (1935); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
4-6 (1935). 
6 See H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935). 
1 § I0(e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). 
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unless the failure or neglect to urge such an objection can be excused be-
cause of extraordinary circumstances.8 However, although the power of 
the court to modify, and the limits on that power, are expressly set forth 
in the statute, the judicial interpretation of section IO(e) has not yielded 
uniform results. 
In the leading case of NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.,9 the Supreme 
Court held that the Board had no authority to obtain a decree proscribing 
more than the specific violations found unless the record indicated the 
likelihood of future violations on a wider scale.10 The Board had issued a 
"blanket" order which, in effect, restrained the employer from violating 
any and all provisions of the act. Since the decision in the Express Pub-
lishing case, however, the practice of the Board in issuing broad cease-and-
desist orders has shifted to orders restraining specific unfair labor practices 
against any other employer or union. This practice has not been favorably 
received by the courts, the majority of which have modified the orders 
when properly objected to, relying on Express Publishing.11 The courts 
have the authority when they are "called upon to enforce such orders by 
their own decrees, [to] examine its scope to see whether, on the evidence, 
they go so beyond the authority of the Board as to require modification as 
a matter of law before enforcement."12 The reasons most often given are that 
s The relevant portions of § IO(e) are as follows: "The Board shall have power to 
petition any court of appeals of the United States ... for the enforcement of such order 
and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. • . . [T]he court shall have 
power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, 
and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or 
setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been 
urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, 
unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extra-
ordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if 
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be 
conclusive." 
9 312 U.S. 426 (1941). See Manoff & Schmiedigen, The Express Publishing Co. Case, 
23 B.U.L. REv. 477 (1943). See also Note, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 554 (1941). 
10 "To justify an order restraining other violations it must appear that they bear 
some resemblance to that which the employer has committed or that danger of their 
commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past." 
312 U.S. at 437. 
11 Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960) (per curiam); NLRB v. Mis-
cellaneous Drivers & Helpers, 293 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Dallas Gen. Drivers 
Union, 281 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1960) (per curiam); NLRB v. Bangor Bldg. Trades Council, 
278 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1960); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960); 
NLRB v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 267 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1959); NLRB 
v. UMW, 202 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. UMW, 198 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 884 (1952); NLRB v. UMW, 195 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 920 (1953); NLRB v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 123 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. 
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941); McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. 
v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 
1941). Contra, NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943). See Note, 29 GEo. 
L.J. 1026 (1941). 
12 May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 392 (1945). 
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Congress did not intend to make of the courts mere rubber stamps to the 
Board's unrestrained will,13 but that it was to be the function of the courts 
under the act to determine, in their discretion, whether the findings are 
supported by the evidence and whether the scope of the order is an appro-
priate exercise of the Board's jurisdiction.14 
Although it is settled that a court will consider the appropriate scope 
of a proposed decree when the respondent properly objects to its breadth,15 
it is not quite so clear whether a respondent may question the scope of a 
proposed decree when he failed to make such objection before the Board. 
In a dissenting opinion in the Express Publishing case, Mr. Justice Douglas 
contended that the majority had overstepped the limits of judicial review 
of Board orders established by section lO(e), as no objection had been 
raised at any time to tl1e breadth of the order.16 Thereafter in NLRB v. 
Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., the Court held that a court of appeals could not 
modify a Board cease-and-desist order where no such objection had been 
made before the Board.17 This holding has been followed in two circuits.18 
Two other circuits19 have apparently adopted the view, expressed by Mr. 
Justice Stone in his concurring opinion in Cheney,20 that a petition for 
enforcement of a Board order calls for an exercise of the equity powers of 
the court, including at least "the power to fix, on its own motion, the scope 
of the decree which it may be required to enforce by contempt proceedings, 
in conformity to recognized equitable standards applied to the record 
before it.''21 The First Circuit, however, has been inconsistent in its applica-
tion of section IO(e).22 This range of judicial opinion following the Cheney 
case has involved, for the most part, situations in which the respondent, 
due to his default, was unable to object to the scope of the order before the 
Board. The statutory answer to modifications seems clear enough in these 
circumstances, as section IO(e) provides that failure or neglect to urge an 
13 NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., ll9 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1941). 
14 Ibid. See also cases cited note ll supra. 
15 See May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945), and cases cited note ll supra. 
16 312 U.S. at 439. Cf. Moog Industries, Inc. v. !<TC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) (per 
curiam). 
17 327 U.S. 385 (1946). The Supreme Court reiterated this view in NLRB v. Seven-Up 
13ottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953). See NLRB v. District 50, UMVv, 355 U.S. 453 (1958); 
cf. United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 
321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
18 Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Com-
bined Century Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1960). 
10 "The whole structure of the law demands judicial consideration when an order of 
enforcement is prayed." NLRB v. Red Spot Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1951) 
(dictum); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1941) (implied); cf. NLRB v. 
W. B. Jones Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1957). 
20 327 U.S. at 391. 
21 Ibid. 
22 In 1941 the court enforced a "blanket" Board order, holding that it was justified 
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objection before the Board may be excused when extraordinary circum-
stances exist.23 However, the modification problem is of a different nature 
in a consent case where the respondent has affirmatively agreed to the 
scope of the proposed decree. 
Taken literally, the clause of section IO(e) relied upon by the Court in 
the principal case24 does not necessarily restrict a court's power to narrow a 
decree in situations in which proper objection has been made before the 
Board. The clause refers only to consideration of "objections" and does not 
purport to cover the "consent order" situation where no objections what-
ever can be presented. Moreover, the legislative history of the clause in-
dicates that its purpose was merely to allow the Board a prior opportunity 
to rule on the specific issue before the court,25 in keeping with the general 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.26 However, as early as 
1928 the Supreme Court held that once a court has jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter and of the parties, "even gross error in the [consent] decree 
would not render it void."27 So also, in Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB,28 
the Court implied that all issues contained in a consent decree were pre-
cluded from review by section lO(e). In light of the need for speedy resolu-
by the circumstances, NLRB v. Reed &: Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941). In 1960, it expressly followed Express Publishing in modifying 
a broad order, NLRB v. Bangor Bldg. Trades Council, 278 F.2d 287' (1st Cir. 1960). In 1947, 
the court expressly followed the Cheney majority, NLRB v. Draper Corp., 159 F.2d 294 
(1st Cir. 1947), and NLRB v. Cutler, 158 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1947) (per curiam). In NLRB 
v. Auburn Curtain Co., 193 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1951), the court enforced a broad default 
order, disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Red Spot Elec. Co., 
191 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1951). In 1955 the court expressly followed the Auburn Curtain 
Co. case in NLRB v. Hansen, 220 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1955). In Local 111, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters, 278 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1960), the court reversed its position from the Auburn 
Curtain case, and modified a broad default decree. 
23 § lO(e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). 
24 § IO(e), 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958): "No objection 
that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be con-
sidered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be 
excused because of extraordinary circumstances." 
25 "The provision in both drafts that the objections not urged before the Board shall 
not be considered by the court except under unusual circumstances is included for the 
reason that administrative tribunals are frequently harried and their proceedings unduly 
prolonged by objections raised for the first time in the reviewing court. Plain justice 
requires that objections should first be made before this Board." NLRB, 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HxsToRY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Ac:r 1362, Comparison of s. 2926 (73d Cong.) 
and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) Senate Comm. Print (1949). See also Hearings on S. 2926 Before 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1934). 
26 See generally 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 20.01-.10 (1958); cf. FPC v. Colorado 
Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 498 (1955). 
27 Swift &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928) (a broad antitrust consent decree). 
28 318 U.S. 253 (1943). The parties had expressly reserved jurisdiction of the court of 
appeals to determine one issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that consideration 
on review of all other questions was precluded by § lO(e). See also NLRB v. American 
Mfg. Co., 132 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !119 U.S. 743 (1943); cf. Nashville, C. 8: 
St. L. R.R. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885). 
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tion of labor disputes involving unfair labor practices it would appear that 
judicial review or modification of consent orders should be confined within 
the limiting clause of section IO(e), but the term "objections" should be 
construed to include consent. This was apparently the Court's purpose in 
the Marshall Field case, and was an obvious purpose in the principal case. 
Informal settlements in the delicate area of labor-management relations 
have long been recognized as valuable, particularly in eliminating tedious 
hearings and adjudication, and in avoiding the need for specific admissions 
of wrongdoing and the notoriety concomitant with public proceedings.29 
Prior to the decision in the principal case, both the Second30 and the 
Fifth31 Circuits recognized the limitations on judicial review in consent 
cases imposed by section lO(e). The First Circuit, in the principal case, 
reconsidered its original excision from the consent order in light of the 
Second Circuit decision, but denied a motion for rehearing.32 The court 
reasoned that it had "no right to deny enforcement of an order warranted 
by the record"; but it "equally [had] no right to enter one which is not 
warranted," stating, "We do not think that consent makes the difference."33 
Hence, section IO(e) was no barrier to its sua sponte revision of the consent 
order. Contrary to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court thought that 
"consent makes a significant difference; it relieves the Board of the very 
necessity of making a supporting record. A decree rendered by consent 
'is always affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause.' "34 Since 
it is unnecessary for the Board to make a supporting record in petitions for 
enforcement of consent orders, the Express Publishing doctrine, that a 
blanket cease-and-desist order is beyond the Board's authority unless justi-
fied by the record,35 is not inconsistent with the decision in the principal 
case, and there is a conclusive presumption that the consent order is justi-
fied. But with no record before it, a court of appeals appears even more to 
be a mere rubber stamp to a Board practice of issuing broad orders "as a 
20 NLRB v. J. L. Hudson Co., 135 F.2d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1943). See generally Dunau, 
Consent Adjustments Under the National Labor Relations Act, 12 FED. B.J. 216 (1952); 
cf. Silverberg, Informal Procedures of the National Labor Relations Board, 6 SYRACUSE 
L. REv. 72 (1954); Weyland and Zarky, Informal Procedures Before the NLRB, 1 PRAc. 
I.Aw. 31 (1955). 
30 NLRB v. Combined Century Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1960). 
31 NLRB v. Carpenters' Dist Council, 288 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961) (per curiam); 
NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 132 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 319 U.S. 743 (1943). 
32 283 F.2d 26 (1960). Immediately following the decision in the principal case the 
Supreme Court, in per curiam opinions, reversed three similar cases two of which were 
consolidated with the principal case in the First Circuit. NLRB v. Local 476, Plumbers, 
368 U.S. 401 (1962); NLRB v. Las Vegas Sand &: Gravel Corp., 368 U.S. 400 (1962); NLRB 
v. Brandman Iron Co., 368 U.S. 399 (1962), reversing 281 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960); cf. 
FTC v. Henry Broch &: Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962). 
sa 283 F.2d at 31. 
H 368 U.S. at 323. 
Bl> See, e.g., cases cited notes 10-13 supra. 
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matter of course,"36 a policy which the Fifth Circuit has termed an "abdica-
tion of judical responsibility.''37 
Until such time as employers and unions become more fully aware of 
the ramifications of signing broad consent decrees, the Board will more than 
likely continue its broad-form order policy, despite the controversy such a 
policy has aroused. However, the Supreme Court can extricate itself from 
the purview of such a sweeping decision as is embodied in the principal 
case, by invoking the reservation it laid down in NLRB v. Cheney Cal. 
Lumber Co., that a different result will obtain if the Board has "patently 
traveled outside the orbit of its authority."38 Yet, exactly how it will be 
determined whether the Board has overstepped its authority, and by whom, 
is not clear. Until that determination is made, the courts of appeals will 
find themselves compelled summarily to order enforcement of NLRB con-
sent decrees. 
36 NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 283 F.2d at 29 (1st Cir. 1960). 
37 NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 119 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1941). 
38 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946). 
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